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Dramatic changes have taken place in ASEAN Tariff policy over the last
decade. Notable advances were made in reducing the general or most favored
nation (MFN) tariffs through commitments made under the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World Trade Organization (WTO) multilateral
trade negotiations. More significant gains, however, were achieved through
unilateral actions of individual economies in the region, moving towards more
liberalized and outward looking trade regimes.
This study forms part of a broader analysis of the impact of the Tariff
Reforms of 1995 on Philippine industries, specifically the adoption of the uniform
5 percent tariff by the year 2000. The analysis of ASF.AN tariff profiles is
envisioned to arm policymakers and industry leaders with a more informed basis
for assessing the competitiveness of Philippine products in the ASEAN region
and vis-a-vis the rest of the world.
This study tracks the changes in the tariff structure of ASEAN countries
since the 1980s, based on the latest available customs tariff schedules of seven
ASEAN member countries. The tariff regimes in ASEAN were compared along
four dimensions: (i) average tariff levels over time; (ii) degree of dispersion, as
measured by standard deviation; (iii) simplicity and transparency, as measured
by the range of tariffs, number of rate levels, prevalence of non ad valorem based
rates; and (iv) notable exceptions or use of peak rates. The study also looked into
the preferential rates adopted by each countnj under the Common Effective
Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Program in comparison to the MFN rate. Sectoral
profiles of the CEPT rates were likewise constructed.
The study confirms that average MFN tariffs in ASEAN have declined
substantially in the last decade. Average MFN rates in ASEAN have declined by
as much as 51 percent since 1986. The overall average MFN tariff in ASEAN is
below 10 percent (9.9 percent), but there continues to be a wide disparity in the
tariff structures of ASEAN member countries.
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- Singapore's tariff system is virtually duty free, with very few exceptions.
- Brunei's average tariff is lower than 5 percent, with fairly limited
dispersion; its modal rate is 0 percent.
- At the other extreme is Thailand whose tariff rates are the highest for
most sectors and the most widely dispersed. Its average tariff (19.2
percent) is double that of the regional average. It is also the one that
relies most heavily on non ad valorem based rates, levying specific or
alternative duties on 1,970 of its tariff lines.
- The Philippines and Indonesia have about the same level of average
tariffs of close to 12 percent, but still slightly higher than the overall
ASEAN average. However, tariffs are more widely dispersed in the
Philippines than in Indonesia.
- Malaysia has relatively low average tariffs (7.6 percent), although this
figure does not take into account the impact of specific or compound rates
which are used widely for selected subsectors. The actual average could be
higher if one were to estimate the ad valorem equivalents of the 523 tariff
lines bearing specific or compound rates instead of ad valorem rates.
- The tariff structure of Vietnam, although amended in 1992 and again in
1993, still follows the pattern of highly escalated tariff commonly used
in the 1970s. Negligible tariffs are imposed on capital equipment and
raw materials while high tariffs of from 50 percent to 100 percent are
applied on selected final goods. The average MFN tariff is estimated at
12.1 percent.
Sectoral averages were also constructed and compared across countries. The
study showed that high tariff rates were applied to consumer goods such as
footwear, textiles and garments, furniture and processed food. Sector-by-sector
comparisons revealed that rates were generally higher in Thailand, followed by
the Philippines and Indonesia.
Tariff regimes adopted by each of the ASEAN countries for the following
industry clusters were also compared:food processing; textile and garments; leather
andfootwear; motor vehicles and transport equipment. The subsectors bearing the
highest CEPT rates were textiles and garments, plastics and rubber, and leather
and leather products.
The diversity in tariff structure and underlying policy poses a problem in
the formation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). The use of margins of
preference (MOP) under the ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA)
was afirst attempt to bring ASEAN tariffs closer to a common base. The adoption
of the CEPT could be the answer to the fuU realization of AFTA. The process is
far from over, however, as a number of problems remain. The impact of the
exclusion lists and the continued existence of nontariff barriers such as import
licensing, export quotas, and quantitative restrictions may also have a negative
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liberalization in most countries in theregion augurs wellfor thesteady progress
ofASEAN economiccooperation.
Policy implications for the Philippines are examined in the light of the
continued protectionist trend in some ASEAN countries. Closer coordination
between the government and the private sector in reducing general tariffs and
drawingup policyguidelinesfor CEPT concessionsmaygo a long way in ensuring
the sustainability of thecountry's tradereforms.
I. INTRODUCTION
A number of significant events have led to dramatic changes
in the ASEAN trading environment, notably the conclusion of
the GATT Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
and the establishment of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement
(AFTA). Significant advances have been made in reducing tariffs
among ASEAN member states under the Common Effective
Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Program. Consensus is building steadily
within ASEAN towards the adoption of a free trade area, as
envisioned under the AFTA Agreement in 1992. Confronted with
similar pressures in the international trade arena, ASEAN
member countries have taken unilateral actions to liberalize trade
further, reacting in various degrees in revising their respective
trade regimes.
Beyond ASEAN, the last decade has been marked by an
unprecedented number of international trade negotiations. The
protracted debates which ended in the signing of the GATT/
World Trade Organization Agreement in 1994 have contributed
to the proliferation and/or expansion of regional trading ar-
rangements all over the world. A number of other neighboring
countries have also signified interest in joining the ASEAN un-
der this more liberalizedtrading environment.
All these developments have expectedly resulted in dramatic
changes in the tariff schedules of all the individual ASEAN mem-
ber states. Caught in this environment, Philippine policymakers
have taken a hard look at the prevailing trade policy regime and
embarked on a determined path of trade liberalization, in rela-
tion to its partners in ASEAN, with other member countries of
APEC and with the rest of the world.96 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
II. OBJECTIVES
The goal of this project is to contribute to a better under-
standing of the outcome of trade and tariff negotiations among
ASEAN countries, given the realities of conflicting pressures on
the home front. It is being undertaken in response to the press-
ing need for a basic understanding of the tariff policies underly-
ing the conduct of trade negotiations under the ASEAN Free
Trade Agreement.
This study forms part of a broader analysis of the impact of
the Tariff Reforms of 1995 on Philippine industries, specifically
the adoption of the uniform 5 percent tariff by the year 2000.
The analysis of ASEAN tariff profiles is envisioned to arm
policymakers and industry leaders with a more informed basis
for assessing the competitiveness of Philippine products in the
ASEAN region and vis-a-vis the rest of the world.
The study also offers a baseline which could be used for an
objective and systematic assessment of the progress made thus
far in giving substance to the goal of closer economic coopera-
t-ion under the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Program
(CEPT) in ASEAN. Armed with this information, policymakers
can work more meaningfully towards eventual harmonization
of ASEAN trade policies within the framework of the ASEAN
Free Trade Area (AFTA).
A brief historical perspective of the development of tariff
policy in the ASEAN countries will be provided in Section III,
describing the impact of tariff reforms resulting from the ratifi-
cation of the GATT WTO Agreement in 1994 and any other
unilateral measures taken in recent years. The methodology and
data sources used in this study are discussed in Section IV. In
Section V, current tariff profiles in ASEAN countries are exam-
ined, both on a regionwide basis and on an individual country
basis. Sectoral averages will also be compared across countries.
A parallel exercise will be undertaken in Section VI to com-
pare average tariffs on intra-ASEAN imports. The study will
discuss briefly the general coverage of the concessions granted
by each of the countries under the CEPT and will compare theAZARCON:TARIFF POLICIESIN ASEAN 97
resulting average tariffs in 1996 and 2000. Tariff profiles with
most favored nation (MFN) rates and CEPT concessional rates
wiU be compared, noting that where no concessional CEPT rates
are provided, MFN rates will apply to imports from ASEAN
countries.
Finally, conclusions and policy recommendations will be
drawn in Section VII. A brief discussion on nontarfff forms of
industrial protection which continue to plague the ASEAN re-
gion will also be provided to help provide a better understand-
ing of the obstacles that still stand in the way of efforts at re-
gional economic cooperation.
III. RECENT CHANGES IN TARIFF POLICY AMONG
ASEAN COUNTRIES
Recent shifts in tariff policy in ASEAN have arisen from
developments on three fronts: the multilateral trade negotia-
tions which resulted in the GATT/WTO Agreement, the unilat-
eral tariff reforms undertaken by most ASEAN countries and
the accelerated pace in intra-ASEAN trade liberalization under
the CEPT. The result of all these reforms, barring any major
policy reversal, is the narrowing of the gap between the MFN
tariffs and CEPT rates at the end of the program. With the
dismantling of trade barriers among them, will AFTA lose its
relevance? The analysis that follows may help to shed some light
on this question.
Multilateral trade negotiations. The intense and protracted
debates under the GATT Uruguay Round of Negotiations helped
to forge the ties that brought the ASEAN countries closer to one
another. While trade negotiations were conducted on an indi-
vidual country basis, the ASEAN member countries were per-
ceived to form a single negotiating bloc whose position was
considered worthy of debate. The experience of participating in
the WTO negotiations served the ASEAN countries in good stead
as they were forced to review their individual trade policies in
the context of overall benefits of a more open trading system for
the region.98 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
The individual ASEAN countries' response to the Uruguay
Round can be best described as cautious and conservative. The
net results on their tariff averages before and after the Uruguay
Round are shown in Table 1. Note that while tariff bindings
generally increased, a good number of rates were bound at rates
higher than those actually applied.
Regional liberalization. Disappointed with the progress of
the GATT-Uruguay Round negotiations and the eventual out-
come for developing countries, smaller trading blocs sought to
find ways to improve their trade opportunities and began to
discuss ways of increasing trade on a preferential basis among
themselves. One such group was the ASEAN Free Trade Area
(AFTA), formally launched in 1992 before the conclusion of the
Uruguay Round. ASEAN announced the elimination of tariff
and trade restrictions within seven to fifteen years on a prefer-
ential basis among ASEAN member countries. Initially, this move
was regarded with skepticism by some sectors who looked on
TABLE1
Summary of Uruguay Round Commitment for Industrial Products
of ASEAN Member Countries
Trade-Weighted MFN Bound Tariffs Import
Tariff Average S2 Shares
Country Imports
Pre-UR Post-UR Reduction Pre-UR Post-UR
%
Indonesia 12,603 20.4 36.9 0 30 92
Malaysia 11,270 10.2 9.1 10.8 2 79
Philippines 9,189 23.9 22.2 7.1 9 73
Singapore 32,860 12.4 5.1 58.9 0 67
Thailand 14,555 37.3 28.0 24.9 12 70
Source: Tariff data were supplied by the GATTSecretariat and the International Trade
Policy Division of the World Bank, 1995.
Notes:
1 Imports for most economies are for 1990or the latest available data (1988or 1989)
2 The base year for the data on tariffis 1986;based on bound tariffs
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the modest improvement from the general tariff as unlikely to
make a meaningful impact on intra-ASEAN trade.
These perceptions began to change, however, with the agree-
ment of the ASEAN Economic Ministers in 1995 to: (1) acceler-
ate the timeframe of AFTA from 15 years to 10 years; (2) draw
up a schedule for the gradual reduction of the products ex-
cluded from the CEPT scheme; and (3) the inclusion of unproc-
essed agricultural products (UAP) into the CEPT scheme. A
more detailed discussion on the effects of the new CEPT pack-
age will be made in Section VI.
Unilateral trade reforms. Most of the ASEAN countries
have undertaken major unilateral trade liberalization programs,
some of which occurred only in the last two years. Annex A
provides an update of recent trade policy reforms in the ASEAN
countries. It is noteworthy that, while a number of high tariffs
remain in selected subsectors, the reductions in tariffs are greater
than those committed under the Uruguay Round. The develop-
ment of ASEAN tariffs is shown in Table 2.
TABLE2
Evolution of ASEAN Tariffs
1978-1996
Country 1978 1983-84 1996
Brunei 4
Indonesia 33 33 12
Malaysia 15 25 8
Philippines 44 29 13
Singapore 5 6 0.04
Thailand 29 32 20
Vietnam - 12
ASEAN 25.3 24.8 9.85100 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINBDEVELOPMENT
IV. METHODOLOGY, DATA SOURCES AND ISSUES
Analytical framework. This comparative study of ASEAN
tariff policies is based on a framework of aligned tariff sched-
ules. The study established some degree of concordance among
the individual tariff schedules of the countries which have been
participating actively in the ASEAN Preferential Tariff Arrange-
ments and the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Program
(CEPT), namely, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, which was offi-
cially accepted as a full member of ASEAN only in 1995.
Under the existing post-WTO tariff regime, Most Favored
Nation (MFN) rates apply to imports from all non-ASEAN coun-
tries. For imports among ASEAN member countries, the appli-
cable tariff rate would be the CEPT rate, and for items covered
by the program or, where no CEPT concessions are granted,
MFN rates.
In this study, two sets of cross-country comparisons have been
undertaken for:
• generally applied tariff rates or most favored nation (MFN)
rates; and
• consolidated ASEAN preferential tariffs under the CEPT
scheme and MFN rates
A brief analysis of the CEPT tariffs will be included in this study,
but the more relevant comparison to determine the impact of
tariff concessions granted under the CEPT is between the MFN
schedule and the consolidated CEPT and MFN rates.
While this study does not go into the intricacies of economic
and political pressures surrounding economic policy formula-
tion in the ASEAN countries, it identifies the sensitive and non-
sensitive areas in each country compared to other countries in
the region through an examination of the levels and structure of
their respective tariff regimes. Aside from comparing overall av-
erage tariffs, averages are compared for each of the major in-
dustry groups across all ASEAN member states.AZARCON:TARIFFPOLICIESINASEAN 101
The approach used in this study will be similar to the ones
adopted in two earlier studies undertaken by the Tariff Commis-
sion (1979 and 1985). Three types of estimates will thus be cal-
culated:
• Simple average of nominal tariffs;
° Weighted average tariffs, using individual country im-
ports as weights; and
• Weighted average tariffs, using total ASEAN imports as
weights.
Methods of tariff averaging. Estimates of the over-all aver-
age levels of tariffs were determined for each ASEAN country
and for the ASEAN region as a whole. Based on methods used
by the Secretariat of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)/ intercountry comparisons of tariff structures were ob-
tained by three basic methods:
• Simple arithmetic averages
• Averages obtained using the pattern of actual imports of
each country as weights; and
° Averages based on statutory duty rates weighted by com-
bined ASEAN imports of that commodity or group of
commodities.
In choosing the most acceptable method of averaging tariffs,
this study has been cognizant of the inherent problems in pre-
senUng averages of tariff levels. Being a form of price index,
tariff averaging is subject to the index number problem with
respect to weighting.
Unweighted averages, or simple averages, of all tariff lines
(whether in each commodity group or in the whole tariff sched-
ule) in effect really involves weighting according to an irrel-
evant, fortuitious and internationally incomparable criterion: the
fineness of nomenclature subdivisions (subheadings) in the par-
1. Tumlir,JanandTill,Ladislav, TariffAveraging in International Comparisons.102 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
ticular tariff document. _ The tariff for an important item of
trade, such as crude petroleum, would have the same weight as
a minor item, like tennis balls. Another problem with such
unweighted tariff averages is that they are often biased up-
wards by the presence of a few extremely high tariffs of little
economic significance.
On the other hand, own-trade-weighted averages generally
tend to be biased downwards since prohibitive duties are, by
definition, excluded from the average because of minimal or
nonexistent imports in these tariff lines.
This particular bias can be remedied in a way by introducing
a more neutral standard, external to the country under study.
In this case, one could use the pattern of total ASEAN trade in
the commodity group in question. For this purpose, a third set
of tariff averages was estimated on the basis of tariff rates per
commodity group, weighted by the combined imports of ASEAN
in the same group of commodities.
In addition, several measures of dispersion will also be esti-
mated in order to assess the potential for influencing trade pro-
tection policy, noting that a more dispersed tariff structure lends
itself to a more protectionist regime by raising effective protec-
tion rates.
Data sources. The primary data sources for the study were
the respective tariff schedules of ASEAN member countries as
officially published by government sources. The analysis was
performed on the tariff schedule for 1996, with the exception of
Brunei and Vietnam where the most recently available data on
MFN tariffs are for 1992 and 1994, respectively. The list of refer-
ence documents is shown in Annex B. CEPT rates have been
obtained from official releases of the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta.
The complete lists of commodities excluded from the CEPT con-
sisting of Sensitive Products and those in the Temporary Exclu-
sion Lists would have been useful for this study but unfortu-
nately these were not available at the time of this report.
2. Bell, Harry H., Tariff Profiles in Latin America, ZPraeger Publishers (1971).AZARCON: TARIFF POLICIES IN ASEAN 103
Data issues. The task of preparing an aligned tariff sched-
ule for the entire ASEAN region was complicated by a number
of problems, including (a) the lack of harmonization of customs
tariff schedules; and 0o) the continued application of specific,
compound and alternative duties by a number of countries.
Harmonization of tariff schedules. All the ASEAN countries
had agreed to adopt the universal Harmonized Commodity De-
script-ion and Coding System of the World Customs Organiza-
tion up to the 6-digit level of commodity description. However,
because of different statistical needs or the desire to promote or
protect specific commodities, the total number of tariff lines con-
tinue to vary from country to country. In addition, there is no
common format for creating new subdivisions within the tariff
code.
The result has been a proliferation of subclassifications of
varying complexity. This has proven to be a roadblock in efforts
to conduct intercountry comparisons of tariff levels. The AFTA
Council, in its 7th Meeting in September 1995, recognized this
need and included the harmonization of tariff nomenclatures at
the 8th digit of the Harmonized System Code scheduled for
completion by 1997. This is particularly important in the context
of the CEPT where tariff concessions at the 6-digit level may be
eroded by the exclusion of, or imposition of, higher tariff rates
on items under finer subclassffications, e.g., at the 8- or 9-digit
HS levels.
Inasmuch as this target still remains to be achieved, for the
purposes of this study, all tariff lines were aggregated at the 6-
digit level by taking the average of the tariff rates applicable to
all lines within this common base.
A separate analysis will be done for Vietnam because its
tariff schedule is patterned after an earlier version of the Har-
monized System. An attempt to estimate regional and sectoral
averages will be made based on the latest available information.
Specific and compound tariff duties. Despite a standing agree-
ment in ASEAN to express all tariff rates on an ad valorem
basis, a number of countries have continued to administer spe-
cific, compound or alternative rates of tariff duties. The total104 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
number of tariff lines with specific, compound or alternative
rates of duty is shown in Table 3.
The use of specific or compound tariff rates obscures the true
level of the tariff rate, the exact equivalent of which will have to
be estimated from disaggregated volumes and values of imports
in foreign trade data. The ideal way of dealing with these rates
would have been to estimate the ad valorem equivalents for
such rates based on unit prices obtained from foreign trade sta-
tistics. The ad valorem equivalent may be derived by multiply-
ing the specific rate by the volume of imports for that particular
tariff line and dividing the product by the value of imports for
the same product. Because of data limitations, however, this
study simply noted the incidence of such rates in Table 3 below
and excluded them from the analysis.
• TABLE 3
Use of Specific, Compound or Alternative Rates
No. of Tariff Lines




Malaysia 153 239 131. 523
Philippines - -
Singapore 8 - 3 11
Thailand 157 - 1,813 1,970
Vieh_am
TOTAL 407 1,947 2,593
Definitions:
Specific rate - tariff duty based on given value per unit of imports
Compound rate - tariff duty consisting of a combination of an ad valorem
duty and a specific rate of duty
Alternative rate - tariff duty based on an ad valorem duty or a specific duty,
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Products with specific, compound or alternative rates are found
in the following subsectors:
Country Subsectors
Malaysia Fruitsand fruit preparations
Processed food
Petrochemicals





Fruits and fruit preparations
Cereals
Animal and vegetable fats and oils




Plastic and rubber products
Wood and wood products
Textiles and garments
Paper and paper board
Primary cells and batteries
Electric lamps and bulbs
V. ASEAN TARIFF PROFILES
A. Most Favored Nation (MFN) Basis
Compared at a common base of Six digits, the overall aver-
age MFN tariff rate for ASEAN is 9.9 percent. Table 4 summa-
rizes the unweighted simple average tariff rate per country. Fig-
ure 1 shows the relative levels compared to the overall ASEAN
average. Note the wide disparity in the range of country aver-
ages, from 0 percent (Singapore) to 19.8 percent (Thailand). At
one end of the scale would be the open and liberal trade regimes
of Singapore and Brunei, and at the other end would be the
high levels of tariffs in Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
Note further the higher standard deviations from the average
rate registered by Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. ThisAZARCON: TARIFF POLICIES INASEAN 107
•situation suggests possible opportunities for manipulating the ef-
fective rates of protection (EPRs). Those countries whose standard
deviations are low have fairly uniform tariffs across tariff lines
and are expected to have more neutral protection systems.
Table 4 indicates that Thailand has the highest average tariff
and the most dispersed tariff structure. The Philippines and Indo-
nesia have about the same level of average tariffs but Philippine
tariffs are more widely dispersed. Malaysia, Brunei and Singapore
have low average tariffs and a fairly limited dispersion.
With the exception of Singapore and Brunei, ASEAN tariffs
are generally escalated, with tariffs rising according to the de-
gree of processing. Based on the frequency distribution of ASEAN
tariffs shown in Table 5, a number of significant observations
can be made:
• 91.2 percent of total tariff rates in ASEAN are within the
range of 0 to 30 percent.
° Of the remaining tariff rates (8.8 percent of the total),
one half cluster around the 31 to 40 percent range; 1.1
percent of all tariff lines are between 90 percent and 100
percent.
• Three countries - Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore-are
characterized by a large number of tariff lines with zero
duties, representing more than 50 percent of the total num-
ber of tariff lines in their respective tariff schedules.
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand continue to apply tariff rates of
100 percent and above on a significant number of tariff lines. In
contrast, in Singapore, 99.9 percent of tariff rates are nil.





The sectors with rates of 100 percent or more are the follow-
ing: motor vehicles, motorcycles, alcoholic beverages, and per-TABLE5
Distribution of Tariff Lines by Rate Level
RATE BRU IND MAL PHI SIN THA TOTAL % of Cumulative
Total % of Total
0% 4,259 1,400 4,144 6 5,770 228 15,807 41.5 41.5
0.01 - 10% 958 2,670 1,090 3,608 1 247 8,574 22.5 64.0
10.01 - 20% 939 1,640 1,142 1,128 1 286 5,136 13.5 77.5
20.01 - 30% 27 1,455 1,342 838 2 1,562 -5,226 13.7 91.2
30.01 - 40% - 10 67 34 1 1,336 1,448 3.8 95.0
40.01 - 50% - 1 44 59 130 234 0.6 95.6
• 50.01 - 60% - 15 1 2 726 744 2.0 97.6
60.01 - 70% 8 10 - 8 26 0.1 97.6 _>
70.01 - 80% 3 56 - 324 383 1.0 98.7 O
80.01 - 90% 3 - - 3 0.0 98.7
90.01 - 100% 1 1 410 412 1.1 99.7
Over 100 % 58 29 11 98 0.3 100.0
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fumery in Indonesia; and textile and garments, footwear, um-
brellas, and motor vehicles in Thailand.
The range of tariff rates (lowest and highest rates), the total
number of tariff levels and the modal rate for each country are
showri in Table 6. This information reflects the complexity and
general framework of the individual country tariff schedules.
All these observations highlight the wide disparity in tariff
structures applied by ASEAN countries. A wide gap exists be-
tween the virtually free trade regimes in Singapore and Brunei
and the high levels of tariff rates in Indonesia and Thailand.
On the other hand, the low figures for Thailand and Malay-
sia do not discount the possibility of the existence of higher rates
in the tariff schedule. The number of tariff lines bearing specific
or compound rates is estimated at 1,970 tariff lines in Thailand
and 523 tariff lines in Malaysia.
In the case of the Philippines, while 97 percent of its tariff
rates are in the range of 0 to 30 percent, 161 tariff lines or the
remaining 3 percent are in the range of 35 percent to 100 per-
cent. It will be recalled that most of these rates are the result of
the "tariffication" procedures associated with the lifting of quan-
titative restrictions in the context of agreements made at the
GATT/WTO Agreement. They are of limited duration, how-
TABLE6
Country Comparisons: Degree of Dispersion,
Average and Modal Tariff Rate by Country*
Modal Rate Range of Modal Rate
Country Levels Tariff Rates Mean (% ad val)
Brunei 6 0 - 30 4.41 0
Indonesia 19 0- 200 12.35 5
Malaysia 23 0- 100 7.58 0
Philippines 16 0- 100 12.72 3
Singapore 6 0 - 60 0.04 0
Thailand 29 0 - 100 19.82 5
Vietnam 22 0- 200 12.01 0
*Excluding specific and compound rates.110 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
ever, and are programmed to be reduced within a specified
period of time.
B. Sectoral Analysis
The average MFN rates for the ASEAN region by sector are
shown in Annex C. Based on this table, the average levels for
each sector are ranked in descending order to identify the rela-
tive sensitivity of the sectors concerned (Table 7).
Among the more sensitive sectors are consumer goods such
as footwear, textiles and garments, and processed food. Many
ASEAN countries started out as major exporters of simple manu-
factures, such as textiles and footwear, and continue to protect
these sectors heavily. Accustomed to continued "infant indus-
try" protection, these sectors have resisted trade liberalization
moves in a number of ASEAN countries. Alcoholic beverages are
consistently levied higher rates of duties in all countries along
with cigarettes and tobacco products.
Vehicles and transport equipment also enjoy protected status
except in Brunei. Tariff protection for motor vehicle assembly or
manufacturing is part of a country's commitment to foreign
partners when they decide to invest in the country of their choos-
ing. It is also closely linked to progressive manufacturing pro-
grams which may or may not include the production of a na-
tional car. In Brunei, among the few items that are dutiable are
sophisticated manufactures such as electronics, electrical ma-
chineries, and photographic equipment. Tariffs on agricultural
products are politically sensitive issues. Because of this, negotia-
tions on agricultural tariffs are generally considered separately
from industrial tariffs, both in the GATT/WTO and in the CEPT.
Average rates of less than 10 percent are imposed on most base
metals, chemicals and mineral and petroleum products.
A comparison of sectoral tariff averages across ASEAN coun-
tries highlights the following observations. Based on MFN rates,
average sectoral rates are consistently higher in Thailand fob
lowed by the Philippines and Indonesia. On a sector-by-sector
basis, the comparative levels in all countries are shown in Annex
C. The highest rates are found in alcoholic beverages and to-AZARCON: TARIFF POLICIES IN ASEAN 111
TABLE 7
Sectoral Profile of ASEAN Tariffs
HS Chapter/s Description Average Sector Rate
(per cent)
16-24 Alcoholic beverage, tobacco products and
processed food 26.51
64-67 Footwear, headgear, umbrellas 20.42
86-89 Vehicles and transport equipment 19.41
06-14 Vegetable products 19.25
50-63 Textiles and garments 19.21
39-40 Plastics and rubber & articles thereof 18.52
15 Animal and vegetable fats and oils 18.19
94-96 Furniture 15.85
01-05 Live animals and animal products 15.58
4749 Pulp, paper and paper products 15.48
68-70 Ceramics and glass 15.17
72-83 Base metals 15.02
41-43 Raw hide and leather 12.90
93 Arms and ammunition 11.53
4446 Wood and wood products 10.98
71 Precious metals, stones and jewelry 9.38
97-98 Works of art, collector's pieces 8.62
84-85 Machinery and mei:hanical appliances 7.96
25-27 Mineral and petroleum products 7.95
90-92 Optical, medical, photographic and
musical instruments 7.12
28-38 Chemicals and chemical products 6.38
bacco (HS Chapters 16-24); motor vehicles (HS Chapters 86-89);
coffee and tea (HS Chapter 9); fruits and nuts (HS Chapter 8);
processed foods (HS Chapters 16-24); textiles and garments (HS
Chapters 50-63); and footwear (HS Chapters 64-67).
Figures 2 and 3 compare the levels of tariffs on some selected
subsectors:
• Live animals and animal products
• Processed food
• Iron and steel products
• Textiles and garments114 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
C. Progression of Tariff Rates within Sectors
A more relevant analysis, however, is the examination of the pro-
gression of rates within sectors, as well as a comparison of findings
across countries. For this analysis, special emphasis was given to
selected politically sensitive industries, viz., leather and footwear,
textile and garments, food processing, and transport equipment.
By and large, in all the subsectors examined tariff structures
remain graduated, with the highest protection afforded to final
goods. Evidence of excessively high rates of EPRs is demonstrated
with a practically duty free entry of raw materials and capital
equipment and higher than average rates on final products. In
contrast, the free trade regime of Singapore highlights the wide
disparity in tariff regimes in ASEAN.
• Textile and Garments
A comparison of levels from raw fiber to garments reveals that
the structure of protection is comparable in the Philippines, Indonesia,
and Malaysia but much higher in Thailand. It is also interesting to
note that the Philippines is the only ASEAN country which imposes
the same tariff rate on textile yarns and woven or knitted fabrics.
• Leather and Footwear
Raw hide, which is the basic raw material for footwear, is duty
free in other ASEAN countries but subject to the minimum 3 per-
cent duty in the Philippines. Leather, on the other hand, enjoys
protection in the Philippines but is practically duty free in other
ASEAN countries. This is good news for the Philippine leather
industry but a major problem to footwear manufacturers. The
implications for the Philippine footwear industry are clear: the 20
percent tariff on leather makes the footwear industry
uncompetitive in the region.
° Food Processing
Table 10 presents the tariff in the meat processing industry.
the distorted tariff structure of the food processing industry in the
Philippines stems from the high tariff duties on corn. This is one
area which clearly calls for a policy review. Compared to the restAZARCON: TARIFF POLICIES IN ASEAN 115
TABLE 8
Tariff Structure of Selected Industries:
TEXTILES & GARMENTS
Product PHI IND MAL SIN THA
Ad valorem Applied
Textile fibers 3 10 Nil Nil 5 5
Yarn 10 10 10 Nil 30 20
Woven fabrics 10 20 20 Nil 80 40
Knit fabrics 10 20 20 Nil 100 -40
Garments 20 30 20 Nil 100 45
TABLE 9
Tariff Structure of Selected Industries:
LEATHER & FOOTWEAR
Product PHI IND MAL SIN THA
Ad valorem Applied
Raw hide 3 0 Nil Nil 30
Leather 20 0 Nil Nil 20 5
Footwear 30 20 30 Nil 100 45
TABLE 10
Tariff Structure of Selected Industries:
FOOD PROCESSING
Product PHI IND MAL SIN THA
Ad valorem Applied
Corn 35/80 0 Nil Nil B2.75/kg
Animal Feeds 45 5 Nil Nil 10 10
Live Animals
Bovine 30/40 a/ 0 to 10 Nil Nil 40 10
Swine 30/50 a/ 10 Nil Nil 40 10
Poultry 40/65"/ 10 Nil Nil 40 40
Meat of
Bovine 30/80 a/ 20 Nil Nil 60 60
Swine 30/80"/ 20 Nil Nil 60 60
Poultry 45/80*/ 15 to 20 Nil Nil 60 60
Processed Meat 30/80 a/ 20 to 25 Nil to Nil 60 or 60 or
20 BS0/kg BS0/kg
a. Refers to tariffs on In-quota and Out-quota imports.116 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
of ASEAN, the Philippines is the only country that imposes heavy
import duties on corn. The $2.75/ kilogram specific duty on corn
in Thailand has no effect on domestic users of corn since Thailand
is a net exporter.
• Motor Vehicles and Other Transport Equipment
Motor vehicle assembly and manufacturing enjoys one of the
highest levels of protection across ASEAN. Malaysia applies the
most protective tariffs on motor vehicles followed by Indonesia,
the Philippines and Thailand. Added to this is the adoption of
domestic car manufacturing programs in Malaysia, Indonesia, and
the Philippines. Under this system, the EPRs increase to atrocious
levels because of special low rates on CKD packs. Singapore im-
poses no duties on motor vehicles but subjects all car sales to a 41
percent excise tax.
Motorcycle assembly or manufacturing is likewise a protected
subsector, enjoying special tariff regimes for CKD packs in the
Philippines and Malaysia. Bicycle manufacturing no longer en-
joys the protective levels it once enjoyed in the region, with the
exception of Thailand which still continues to impose a 40 per-
cent duty on imported bicycles.
A World Bank Study (1993) suggests that the current trade
regime in Vietnam has substantial tariff and quantitative restric-
tions. Vietnam's tariff structure, though amended in 1992 and
again in 1993, follows the pattern in most developing countries in
the 1970s. Negligible tariffs are imposed on capital equipment and
medicines while high tariffs of from 50 to 100 percent are applied
on footwear, softdrinks, alcoholic beverages; cigarettes, and cos-
metics. The MFN average tariff (unweighted) basis for Vietnam is
estimated at 12.1 percent.
Vietnam also has considerable quantitative restrictions such
as import licensing and quotas for some commodities.
Comparison of simple and trade-weighted averages of ASEAN
tariffs. There is no marked pattern in the different tariff averages
obtained via the three methods of computing tariff averages. The
averages are generally highest using ASEAN trade values ofAZARCON: TARIFF POLICIES IN ASEAN 117
TABLE 11
Tariff Structure of Selected Industries:
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT
Product PHI IND MAL SIN THA
• Ad valorem Applied
Motor Vehicles




Assemblies 3 0 to 5 5 No duties
applied
41% Excise tax








Assemblies 3 25 5 No duties 40 40
applied
12% Excise tax
CBU 40 35 to 150 25 No duties 60 60
Motorcycles applied
12% Excise tax
Bicycle Parts 20 10 to 15 25 No duties 40 40
applied
12% Excise tax
Bicycles 20 30 25 No duties 40 40
applied
12% Excise tax118 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
TABLE12
Average MFN Tariffs of ASEAN Countries
Simple and Trade Weighted Averages
Trade Weighted
Country Simple Average Own Country ASEAN
Brunei 4.4 6.3 8.2
Indonesia 12.4 11.6 5,5
Malaysia 7.6 10.64 10.7
Philippines 12,7 10.8 10.3
Singapore 0.4 0.5 0.4
Thailand 19.8 23.4 24.6
weights. This supports the view that using the total imports from
ASEAN as weights leads to a more neutral standard as compared
to using own-country import values. The latter are prone to be
biased downwards especially in the case of restrictive duties.
VI. INTRA-ASEAN TARIFFS
With the impressive gains made in implementing the goals of
the CEPT Program, it will be interesting to note how these trans-
late into concrete tariff concessions affecting intra-ASEAN trade.
A parallel analysis was conducted for tariff rates under the CEPT
Program, both for 1996 and 2000, and these were compared with
current MFN rates. 4
Comparisons were drawn from the official country submis-
sions to the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta. The impact of the CEPT
concessions on the overall tariff average for the ASEAN region is
presented in Table 13. Note that the average tariff of all CEPT
lines was 5.28 percent in 1996 and 2.92 percent in year 2000 as
compared to the estimated MFN average of 9.86 percent in 1996.
This represents a 46.5 percent reduction in 1996 with rates under
the CEPT Program and an even better outlook for the year 2000
when the percentage reduction will have dropped by a total of
4, The same reservation is made regarding the limitations related to the exclusion of
specific rates from the analysis.TABLE 13 ;>
Rates by HS Sectio_Sector Averase
Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Program N
BRUNEI INDONESIA MALAYS IA PHILIPPINES O
Chapter Average Rate No. of Average Rate No. of Average Rate No. of Average Rate No. of .__'Z
From To 1996 2000 % Dec. Lines 1996 2000 % Dec. Lines 1996 2000 % Dec. Linea 1996 2000 % Dec. Limes
01 05 0.00 0.00 193 11.82 7.52 36.38 194 1.10 0.81 26.36 194 6.35 3.46 45.51 194
06 14 0.00 0.00 273 6.48 4.82 25.62 270 0.63 0.47 25.40 268 7.14 3.19 55.32 271
15 15 0.00 0.00 53 5.14 3.11 39.49 52 1.55 1,50 3.23 53 7,85 2.34 70.19 ,53
16 24 0.06 0.06 165 13.49 8.30 38.47 181 4.46 2.21 50.45 180 10.02 5.48 45.31 181
25 27 0.00 0.00 151 3.07 2.79 9.12 151 0.84 0.55 34.52 151 3.73 2.74 26.54 1,50
28 38 0.29 0.28 3.45 756 3.11 2.43 21.86 759 0.66 0.42 36.36 760 4.96 3.23 34.88 759 m.q
39 40 0.08 0.04 50.00 187 7.06 2.69 61.90 189 8.20 3.51 57.20 187 9.18 4.46 51.42 189 Z
43 0.59 0.59 74 7.16 2.87 59.92 74 2.82 1.26 55.32 74 16.34 6.69 59.06 74 41
44 46 8.31 2.81 66.19 79 7.34 4.81 34.47 79 9.36 6.01 35.79 67 12.11 5.90 51.28 79
149 6.27 3.20 48.96 149 7.17 5.01 30.13 148 6.I 6 3.09 49.84 149 47 49 0.00 0.00
50 63 3.50 3.50 808 13.82 4.78 65.41 809 7.00 3.93 43.86 809 11.06 5.23 52.71 809
64 67 3.68 3.68 55 19.83 12.38 37.57 55 10.62 5.16 51.41 52 10.24 6.18 39.65 5,5
68 70 0.27 0.17 37.04 138 9.42 5.55 41.08 138 5.03 Z86 43.14 139 11.63 5.60 51.85 138
71 71 2.60 2.60 52 7.99 4.64 41.93 52 1.25 1.21 3.20 52 5.91 5.48 7.28 52
72 83 0.02 0.01 50.00 587 8.12 5.26 35.22 587 4.79 2.86 40.29 586 10.57 5.38 49.10 587
84 85 5.25 2.59 50.67 739 7.60 4.23 44.34 762 Z67 1.73 35.21 762 5.74 4.03 29.79 762
86 89 0.00 0.00 135 3.90 2.51 35.64 132 3.89 2.61 32.90 131 3.75 2.75 26.67 132
90 92 3.32 2.45 26.20 208 7.12 4.94 30.62 230 0.93 0.71 23.66 230 8.07 3.81 52.79 230
93 93 0.00 0.00 17 0.00 0.00 17 1.29 0.94 27.13 17 0.97 0.68 29.90 17
94 96 1.72 1.72 133 17.08 10.90 3618 131 6.79 4.28 36.97 I31 15.13 8.06 46.73 131
97 98 0.00 0.00 10 10.52 6.63 36.98 7 3.06 2.78 9.15 8 20.00 7.86 60.70 7
Average 1.81 1.28 29.28 4,962 8.36 4.60 44.98 5,018 3.76 2.21 41.22 4,999 8.17 4.38 46.39 5,019
Note: Rates and number of lines are based on averages at 6-dig_t level.TABLE 13 (CONTINUED) Fo Q
SINGAPORE THAI LAND VIETN A M ASEAN
Chapter Average Rate No. of Average Rate No, of Average Rate No. of Average Rate No. of
From To 1996 2000 % Dec. Lines 1996 2000 % Dec. Lines 1996 2000 % Dec. Lines 1996 2000 % Dec. L[nea
01 05 0.00 0,00 194 21.92 12,97 40.83 195 4,.29 4.29 7 6.50 4,15 36.t3 167
06 14 0.00 0,00 268 19.13 11.20 41.45 233 4,43 4.43 23 5,40 3,44 36.23 229
15 15 0.00 0.00 52 13.56 4.72 65.19 53 4,00 4,00 16 4,59 2.24 51,18 47
16 24 0.00 0,00 158 21.47 12,58 41,41 143 5.00 5.00 1 7.79 4.80 38,29 144
25 27 0.00 0,00 142 5.53 3.94 28.75 151 1.21 1,21 67 Z05 1.60 21.91 138
28 38 0,00 0.00 759 9.36 5.47 41.56 758 1.00 1,00 21 2.77 1.83 33.80 653
39 40 0.05 0,04 20,00 189 19.69 8.11 58.81 189 2.81 2,81 16 6.72 3.09 53.98 164
41 43 0.00 0.00 74 10.59 4.73 55.34 74 3.67 3.67 24 5.88 2.83 51.88 67
44 46 0.00 0,00 79 12.41 7.49 39,65 79 4.50 4.50 8 7.72 4.50 41.66 67
47 49 0.00 0,00 149 16.81 10,54 37.30 149 1.87 1.87 27 5.47 3.39 38.06 131 O
50 63 0.00 0.00 809 20.28 5.19 74.41 809 1.39 1.39 42 8.15 3.43 57.90 699
64 67 0.00 0,00 55 22.62 13,41 40.72 55 1.00 1.00 1 9.71 5.97 38_51 47 Z
68 70 0.00 0,00 138 18.37 ZOO 61.89 138 1.88 1.88 25 6.66 3.29 50,52 122 _>
71 71 0.00 0.00 52 7.27 2.89 60,25 52 0.00 0.00 3.57 Z40 32,77 45 ,._r"
72 83 0.00 0,00 587 12.62 8.39 33,52 587 0.46 0.46 145 5.23 3.19 38.87 524
84 85 0.00 0,00 762 7.96 5.44 31,66 762 0.09 0.09 336 4.19 2.59 38.2I 698 P'_
86 89 0.00 0,00 117 9,40 5.94 36,8I 132 0.31 0.31 35 3.04 2.02 33.55 116 90 92 0.00 0,00 230 9,24 6.38 30,95 230 0.71 0.71 42 4.20 2.71 35.35 200
93 93 0.00 0,00 17 22.79 13.38 41,29 17 0,00 0,00 3,58 2.14 40,12 15
94 96 0.00 0.00 131 20,58 10.67 48,t5 131 0.00 0,00 1 8.76 5.99 41,88 113
97 98 0.00 0.00 9 8,93 5,36 39.98 7 0.00 0.00 6.07 3.23 46.77 7
Average 0.00 0.00 4,971 13.95 7.08 49.25 4,944 0.92 0.92 837 5.28 2.92 44.63 4,393
LL]
Note: Rates and number of lines are ba_edon average_¢ at 6-digit level. 0
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70.5 percent. Based on these observations, the highest CEPT rates
were found in the following subsectors:
HS Chapter/s Industry
50-63 Textile and garments
39-40 Plastics and rubber
41-43 Leather and leather products
(excluding footwear)
15 Vegetable oils
97-98 Works of art
94-96 Furniture
44-46 Wood and wood products
93 Firearms
68-70 Ceramics and glass
72-83 Base metals
The question, however, may be raised: Which countries and
what sectors are likely beneficiaries of these concessions? To an-
swer these questions, comparisons were made of MFN tariffs and
CEPT tariffs for 1996 and 2000 across all ASEAN countries. The
results are shown in Table 14. It is suggested, however, that the
more pertinent comparison that needs to be made is not only be-
tween MFN and CEPT tariffs but also that between MFN rates
and those contained in a consolidated tariff schedule resulting
from the integration of the MFN files and CEPT files. To explain
further, the consolidated file will consist of the CEPT levels where
these are granted, and with MFN rates where no CEPT conces-
sions are granted. This new file will more accurately reflect the
prevailing tariff regime in any particular country and in ASEAN
as a whole. (See Annex E.)
Comparison of MFN and CEPT tariff rates. The results of the
analysis comparing CEPT tariffs across industry groups or
subsectors are summarized in Table 14.
Comparison of MFN and CEPT rates under a consolidated schedule.
For purposes of a more realistic basis for looking at how ASEAN
tariffs will change with the introduction of CEPT concessions, a122 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
TABLE 14
Comparison of MFN and CEPT Tariff Rates
Tariff CEPT Tariff Rates
MFN
Country Rates 1996 % Decrease 2000 Total Decrease (%)
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (4-5)
Brunei 4.4 1.81 58.9 1.28 70.9
Indonesia 12.4 8.36 32.6 4.6 62.9
Malaysia 7.6 3.76 50.5 2.21 70.9
Philippines 12.7 8.17 35.7 4.38 65.5
Singapore 0.0 0 - 0 -
Thailand 19.9 13.95 29.8 7.08 64.4
Vietnam 12.1 0.92 92.4 0.92 92.4
ASEAN 9.9 5.28 46.6 2.92 70.5
consolidated table of MFN and CEPT rates was constructed. Spe-
cifically, where concessions were granted at 6-digit level, CEPT
rates were used; where no concessions were granted, MFN rates
were used. The resulting consolidated table more closely reflects
the actual implementation of the CEPT Program especially for
those subsectors which do not enjoy any concession under the
CEPT. The detailed consolidated table is shown in Annex E.
To use only MFN rates in comparing ASEAN tariff levels would
overstate actual tariff levels. On the other hand, to use only CEPT
rates would result in understating applicable rates since a signifi-
cant number of items are still excluded from the CEPT Program.
TABLE 15
Average ASEAN Tariffs Under a Consolidated Tariff Schedule
Tariff Merged
Country MFN Rates MFN/CEPT CEPT Rates
Brunei 4.4 2 1.81
Indonesia 12.4 8.6 8.36
Malaysia 7.6 4.0 3.76
Philippines 12.7 8.5 8.17
Singapore 0.0 0.0 0.00
Thailand 19.9 14.0 17.95
Vietnam 12.1 - 0.92
ASEAN 9.9 6.2 5.28AZARCON:TARIFF POLICIES INASEAN 123
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The study confirms that MFN tariffs in ASEAN have de-
clined substantially in the last decade. Compared to findings in
earlier studies, ASEAN MFN tariffs have declined by as much as
51 percent since 1986. This had been the combined effect of
multilateral and unilateral actions involving trade liberalization.
In addition, the acceleration in the pace of dismantling tariff
barriers under the CEPT Program was expected to further re-
duce the ASEAN tariff average by as much as 70 percent. This
development augurs well for the future of trade cooperation in
the ASEAN region.
Nonetheless, a few problems still remain. The intransigence of
some sectors to remain behind protective tariffs by seeking exclu-
sion from CEPT reduction continues to challenge ASEAN leaders.
There is also the continuing problem of nontariff barriers includ-
ing state trading operations, the use of export taxes, arbitrary
customs procedures, and the abuse in the application of the Rules
of Origin which threatens the success of the CEPT Program.
Transparency in the rules of the game is essential in the
administration of a complex undertaking such as the CEPT Pro-
gram. The harmonization of customs tariff schedules along the
lines of the scheme adopted by the European Community will
facilitate the progress of future exchanges of concessions under
the CEPT. Also, the use of ad valorem tariffs instead of the
proliferation of specific or compound rates would make cross-
country comparisons less tedious in the future.
The study has identified the sectors and subsectors whose
rates make them likely prospects for further trade liberalization
in the context of CEPT. The wide disparity in average tariffs
among certain industry groups could be useful in pinpointing
targets for future discussions on regional cooperation.
VIII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PHILIPPINES
Where does the Philippines find itself, given this background
on the tariff policies of other ASEAN countries? Some sectors claim
that the Philippines must chart its own economic destiny, without124 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
regard to what the Other ASEAN countries are doing. Ultimately,
they say our economic programs must rely primarily on the proper
management of our own resources. On the other hand, interna-
tional trade is an interactive exercise which does not take place in
a vacuum. Like water, imports will flow where the tarifffs are
lowest.
Some disturbing aspects in the progress of AFTA come to mind
as a result of this limited analysis:
(1) Some countries, such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Indone-
sia continue to pursue protective tendencies in their tariffs. Given
the similarity of our production mix, what effect will this have on
Philippine industries?
(2) It was observed that under the unilateral reform programs
undertaken by ASEAN countries, exceptions were made for cer-
tain industries. This trend was carried over to the area of CEPT
concessions, resulting in the application of higher rates or special
exclusions.
The Philippines, on the other hand, makes no exceptions, to
the delight of ASEAN manufacturers and the consternation of
Philippine producers. The prospect of adopting a uniform tariff of
5 percent within three years needs to be justified due to the very
real threats posed by alternative suppliers in ASEAN.
(3) With the cumulative rules of origin, Singapore will likely
be the biggest beneficiary of CEPT. How does the Philippine gov-
ernment propose to counter this trend? What steps can it take to
make the benefits more equitably distributed?
In trying to evaluate the dimensions of the problem of further
trade reforms in the Philippines, it may be useful at this stage to
take a hard look at the competitiveness of Philippine industries
vis-a-vis its neighbors in the region. Furthermore, the timing of
the Philippine unilateral tariff reforms needs to be synchronized
with those under the CEPT program.
It is hoped that the findings of this study can contribute to
the crafting of a well-coordinated approach to the announced
targets by pinpointing areas for further reform.AZARCON: TARIFFPOLICIESIN ASEAN 125
ANNEX A
Recent Changes in Trade Policies of ASEAN Countries
BRUNEI The relatively small size of Brunei compared to Lhe rest of
ASEAN countries belies the economic importance of this coun-
try. Brunei Darrussalam is a stable and prosperous country
(GNP: $4,624 M, 1995) which enjoys a strategic location in
Southeast Asia. Its economy is based mainly on oil, and
liquified natural gas industries.
Because of its heavy dependence on crude oil and petro-
leum-based exports, tariff policy does not play a major role in
Brunei's economic development plans and programs, it is only
in recent years that Brunei has consciously pursued a drive to
increase the share of the nonofl and gas based sector in GNP.
Brunei's trade policy is essentially open, next only to
Singapore, with 68.8 percent of import commodities at zero
duty and the rest within a range of 5 to 30 percent. The only
exceptions are those on alcoholic beverages, and tobacco. The
average rate of duty is computed at 4.41 percent; the dutiable
items are alcoholic beverages and tobacco, coffee and tea, elec-
trical machinery, photographic equipment, furniture, and tex-
tile and garments.
INDONESIA Indonesia suffered large current account deficits in the early
1980s due to falling prices of its oil exports. This situation led
to an overall reform and adjustment process which included a
reform of the tariff in 1.985and 1986. From an average tariff of
32 percent at the start of the program, it dropped to 27 per- cent
by 1986 and dropped further to 20 percent in 1993_ However,
the dispersion remained high with a standard deviation of 17
percent from the average tariff. The tariff system was rational-
ized further: peak rates were dismantled resulting in a new
tariff range of 0 to 30 percent. In May 1995, tariffs on 6,030
were reduced, bringing the average tariff down to 15 percent.
For the first time, a schedule of timebound tariff reductions
were announced. By the year 2003, the average tariff will be 7
percent with most rates within a range of I to 7 percent and a
maximum rate of 10 percent.
Some exceptions are made, however. Among these are agri-
cultural products, which like other countries will be "tariffied"
in accordance with WTO commitments, motor vehicles, chemi-126 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
cals and metal products, all of which have a separate schedule
of reduction over a ten-year period. There will be no tariff re-
ductions on alcohol and alcoholic products. Finally, import
surcharges which were a nontariff barrier affecting imports,
were reduced or eliminated in 1995. These exceptions make it
difficult to gauge the impact of the reforms on the dispersion of
rates.
Side by side with the reform of the tariff rate structure was
the simplification of the tariff system. The use of specific and
compound tariff rates was terminated, and the number of lev-
els of rates was reduced.
MALAYSIA After serious setbacks in export revenues caused by heavy
dependence on primary exports in the 1970s and early 1980s,
Malaysia undertook some major reforms in trade and indus-
trial policies. These reforms led to impressive gains in its manu-
factured exports while at the same time maintaining its pri-
mary exports. The tariff reforms helped to ensure that an over-
all favorable environment was in place to support the export
drive.
Malaysia achieved a considerable degree of openness, with
low import duties on manufactured goods. But tariffs on most
high value agricultural products remained comparatively high
at 20 percent and duties have been especially high for some
food and agricultural products. The average (unweighted) nomi-
nal tariff rate declined from 37.9 percent in 1978 to 27.3 percent
in 1987, and dropped further to 14 percent in 1992. Tariffs are
the main trade policy instrument in Malaysia and the tariff
structure is reviewed and revised regularly so that there has
been consistent liberalization on a unilateral basis for the past
several years, with annual tariff reductions announced as part
of the annual budget.
At the same time, a series of tariff reductions were under-
taken to fulfill its commitments under the Uruguay Round of
negotiations under GATr/WTO.
Unfortunately, the impact of all these reforms on the gen-
eral tariff average cannot be accurately determined due to the
prevalence of the use of specific or compound tariff duties which
obscure the real level of the tariff. For this reason, there is a
standing agreement in the CEPT to avoid the use of specific or
compound rates in the tariff submissions. Despite this agree-AZARCON: TARIFFPOLICIESIN ASEAN 127
ment, more than 500 tariff lines or a total of 6.8 percent of total
tariff lines bear specific or compound rates.
The tariff schedule of Malaysia is based primarily on the
latest version (1996) of the Harmonized System of Commodity
Classification, but has been expanded to contain various sub-
classifications, bringing the total number of tariff lines to 7,874.
There are nine levels of tariff rates with a range of a minimum
of 0 to a maximum of 200 percent.
PHILIPPINES Over the last 15 years Philippine trade policy has gone
through significant changes resulting in a steady decline in
the level of tariffs, The first overall tariff reforms began in the
early 1980s as part of a broader-based industrial restructuring
program. The level of average tariffs was brought down from
42 percent to 34.6 percent. The next round of tariff reforms took
effect in 1991, consisting of a five-year program of tariff reduc-
tion with gradual and substantial reductions in the number of
tariffs still remaining at 40 percent and 50 percent. The aim
was to reduce the number of tariff levels to only four levels - 3,
10, 20 and 30 percent, with limited exceptions for sensitive
agricultural products and selected industrial products which
remained subject to 50 percent duty. As a result of the program,
average tariffs fell from 27.6 percent in 1985 and were pro-
jected to fall to 16percent in 1995.
Before the end of the five-year period, subsequent changes
in the tariff schedule reduced the tariff levels even further with
the passage of E.O. 189 which immediately cut down tariff
duties on capital equipment and spare parts for machinery to
10 percent and 3 percent respectively. This was followed by
E.O. 264 and E.O. 288 which again reduced the duty on in-
dustrial products and agricultural products, respectively. This
new multiyear program will bring 767 percent of total tariff
lines to 0 to 10 percent by 2000, after which only two levels
will apply, 3 percent for raw materials and 10 percent for fin-
ished products by the year 2003.
The Philippines has announced its intention to reach a
uniform level of tariff of 5 percent for all industrial products by
2004, achieving its intention to adopt a uniform level of protec-
tion across all sectors by reducing the level and spread of tariff
rates begun in the 1980s.128 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
THAILAND Tariffs have played a major role in Thailand given that rev-
enues from tariff duties heavily accounted for about one-fourth
of tax revenues. In fact, due to fiscal imbalances, tariffs were
raised in 1985. A comparison of average tariffs in 1978 and 1984
showed that average tariffs in Thailand increased from 29.4 to
30.6 percent, second only to Indonesia. By 1987 the unweighted
average tariff was only slightly lower than in 1983 and the
dispersion in tariffs increased (Dean et al. 1994).
The budget surplus from 1988 onwards gave the govern-
ment greater flexibility in pursuing trade liberalization through
substantial tariff reform. Tariffs had been identified as the main
barrier to imports in Thailand. A Tariff Rate Restructuring
Scheme was first introduced in 1990, reducing tariff rates on a
product-by-product basis at the same time simplifying the tar-
iff nomenclature. The second part of the program was an-
nounced at the end of 1994 as part of Thailand's commitment
in the Uruguay Round and AFTA. The reductions are more
broad-based and will result in:
_ • a reduction of tariffs for more than 90 percent of all tariff
lines;
• phasing down of tariffs on 3,900 items, bringing down the
average tariff to 27.24 in 1994 and 17.01 in 1997; and
• a reduction in the number of tariff levels from 39 to 6, with
peak tariff at 30 percent.
Some exceptions still remain, namely, motor vehicles and
parts thereof which remain at 60 percent and alcoholic prod-
ucts and tobacco at 60 percent. A number of tariff lines still
impose specific or compound tariff duties, a reversal of previ-
ous policy which removed these types of rates in Thailand.
Another feature of Thailand's tariff system is the wide dis-
persion of its tariff rates, resulting in high effective protection
for a wide array of manufacturing subsectors such as
agroprocessing products, food products, leather products,
chemicals, textiles and motor vehicles. Implementation of tariff
policy is sometimes inconsistent and discretionary.
VIETNAM From a pure, centrally planned economy based on agriculture,
Vietnam is moving on the road to becoming a socialist market
economy. Recent economic reforms in Vietnam have been geared
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decade. Already there are signs of increased adherence to free
trade rules topped by its application for accession to the World
Trade Organization.
In the wake of its economic reforms, Vietnam's tariff policy
is undergoing a radical transformation as it seeks to find its
place in a more liberalized trading environment. With formal
acceptance of its full membership in ASEAN on 28 July 1995
and its accession to the Agreement on the Common Effective
Tariff Scheme (CEPT) Vietnam will now participate actively in
ASEAN affairs.
As it joins the rest of Asean countries in pursuing the goals
of AFTA,Vietnam's tariff policy needs to be reexamined. From
a system that is built on a policy of protecting agricultural
products and domestic import substituting industries it may
need to reorient its targets as it enters the global market.
The general pattern of protection in Vietnam is shown in
Table 3 which indicates the frequency distribution of tariff rates.
Vietnam's tariff nomenclature is based on earlier versions of
the Harmonized System. It does not, however, faithfully adhere
to the System, eliminating or creating certain tariff lines, as
local conditions require. This can lead to potential difficulties
in negotiations with other trading partners.
The present tariff structure is a complex one consisting of
twenty-two (22) tariff levels ranging from zero to 200 percent
ad valorem. Its overall average nominal rate is estimated at
12.1percent.
Average tariffs of selected sectors are shown below, giving
some indication of the relative restrictiveness of trade in some
commodities. Peak tariffs of 100%and above are found in alco-
holic beverages, tobacco, and motor vehicles. At the other end
of the range, there is a prevalence of what GATT/WTO refers
to as "nuisance tariffs" of 1 percent or 2 percent, which are
difficult to implement.
During the transition period of trade policy reforms, one of
the policy options could well be the simplification of the tariff
structure, first by reducing the levels, and the wide dispersion
in the rate structure. More importantly, a deliberate move to-
wards bringing down peak rates (often redundant in any case)
could achieve the goal of reducing the average level of protec-
tion within a reasonable period of time.130 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
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List of Source Documents
Brunei Darussalam, Royal Customs and Excise Department. Ministry
of Finance. 1992. Brunei Trade Classification 1992.
Malaysia. His Majesty's Government Gazette. January 1996. Customs
Act 1967. Customs Duties Order 1996.
Republic of Indonesia, Department of Finance. Directorate General of
Customs and Excise. 1996./Indonesian Customs Tariff Book.
Republic of the Philippines, Tariff Commission. October 1996. Tariff
and Customs Code of the Philippines.
Singapore, Customs and Excise Department. October 1995. Singapore
Trade Classification and Customs Duties 1996.
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Ministry of Trade. Trade Information
Center. 1994. Import Tariff Export Tariff (Going into effect from
July 1st, 1994).
Thailand Customs Department. 1996. Customs Tariff of Thailand with
Statistical Code Numbers.
?ANNEX C N
Average Rates by HS Section/Sector
Most Favored Nation (MFN)
z
BRUNEI INDONESIA MALAYSIA PHILIPPINES SINGAPORE THAILAND ASEAN
Chapter Ave. No. of Ave. No. of Ave. No. of Ave. No, of Ave. No. of Ave. No. of Ave. Ave. #
From To Rate Lines Rate Lines Rate Lines Rate Lines Rate Lines Rate Lines Rate of Lines _0
O
01 05 0.00 246 14.51 274 3.85 287 28.00 305 0.00 243 47.12 201 15.58 259
06 14 4.22 305 12.05 388 10.77 363 22.18 296 0_19 317 66.06 286 19.25 326 _
15 15 0.00 60 9.12 68 8.59 160 16.43 46 0_00 48 74.99 78 18.19 77
16 24 17.83 317 28.t3 312 22.39 434 27.20 254 1.62 281 61.86 204 26.51 300
25 27 5.71 156 4.61 178 8.54 199 4.68 162 3.56 176 20.60 159 7.95 172 _>
¢.t3
28 38 2.85 955 7.02 1,021 6.94 1,065 5.79 828 0.08 870 15.62 941 6.38 947 t_
39 40 1.07 356 14.31 350 20.78 610 10.96 228 0.00 231 64.00 376 18.52 359
41 43 1.60 75 8.79 95 6.95 105 15.55 82 0.00 74 44.52 89 12.90 87
44 46 10.12 83 6.86 269 9.02 312 19.57 86 0.00 96 20.33 92 10.98 156
47 49 0.00 157 8.91 188 11.77 252 14.76 169 0.00 154 57.45 180 15.48 183
50 63 7.68 992 21.31 1,192 17.63 1,084 13.25 840 0.02 926 55_39 1,282 19.21 1,053
64 67 6.79 53 21.53 75 22.98 85 26.00 55 0.00 58 45.20 66 20.42 65
68 70 0.76 132 9.95 184 26,17 199 17.31 166 0.04 149 36.80 172 15.17 167
71 71 5.09 53 13.56 66 2.87 61 9,49 61 0.00 51 25.27 56 9.38 58
72 83 0.16 549 10.66 830 23,18 1,040 13,71 672 0,05 606 42.36 673 15,02 728
84 85 11.33 1,027 6.25 1,061 8.15 1,202 8.50 907 0,00 913 13.55 869 7.96 997
86 89 7.65 306 37.17 187 31,19 388 13,75 163 0,00 156 26.68 215 I9.41 236
90 92 9.34 272 9.50 280 1.91 282 8,52 250 0,00 245 13.47 244 7A2 262
93 93 0.00 14 11.86 35 15.00 21 14.06 18 0.00 17 28.24 17 I1.53 20
94 96 6.24 149 19.36 181 17.93 234 20.83 146 0.00 t51 30,71 143 15.85 167
97 98 0.00 14 18.21 14 3.53 17 20.00 7 0.00 24 10,00 12 8.62 15
Average 6.02 6,271 13.02 7,248 I4.52 8,400 13.42 5,741 0.22 5,786 7.94 6,355 14.19 6,634ANNEX D o2
Average Rates by HS Section to
Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Program
BRUNEI INDONESIA MALAYSIA PHILIPPINES
Chapter Average Rate No. of Average Rate No. of Average Rate No. of Average Rate No. of
From To 1996 2000 % Dec. Lines 1996 2000 % Dec. Lines 1996 2000 % Dec. Lines 1996 2000 % Dec. Lines
01 05 0,00 0.00 193 11.82 7.52 36.38 194 1.10 0.81 26.36 194 6.35 3.46 45.51 194
06 14 0.00 0.00 273 6.48 4.82 25.62 270 0.63 0.47 25.40 268 7.14 3.19 55.32 271
15 15 0.00 0.00 53 5.14 3.11 39.49 52 1.55 1.50 3.23 53 7.85 2.34 70.19 53
16 24 0.06 0.06 165 13.49 8.30 38.47 181 4,46 2.21 50.45 180 10.02 5.48 45.31 181
25 27 0,00 0.00 151 3.07 2.79 9.12 I51 0.84 0.55 34.52 151 3.73 2.74 26.54 150
28 38 0.29 0.28 3.45 756 3.11 2.43 21.86 759 0.66 0_42 36.36 760 4.96 3.23 34.88 759
39 40 0.08 0.04 50.00 187 7.06 2.69 61.90 189 8.20 3.51 57.20 187 9.18 4.46 51.42 189
41 43 0.59 0,59 74 7.16 Z87 59.92 74 2.82 1.26 55.32 74 16.34 6.69 59.06 74 O
44 46 8.31 2,81 6639 79 7.34 4_81 34.47 79 9.36 6_01 35.79 67 1231 5.90 51.28 79 _a3
47 49 0.00 0.00 149 6.27 3.20 48.96 149 7.17 5_01 30.13 148 6.16 3.09 49.84 149
50 63 3.50 3.50 808 13.82 4.78 65.41 809 7.00 3.93 43.86 809 11.06 5.23 52.71 809
64 67 3.68 3.68 55 19.83 12.38 37.57 55 10.62 5.16 51.41 52 10.24 6.18 39.65 55 O
68 70 0.27 0.17 37.04 138 9.42 5.55 41.08 138 5.03 2.86 43.14 139 11.63 5.60 51,85 138
71 71 2.60 2.60 52 7.99 4.64 41.93 52 1.25 1.21 3.20 52 5,91 5.48 7.28 52 _I_
72 83 0.02 0.01 50.00 587 8.12 5.26 35.22 587 4.79 2.86 40.29 586 10.57 5.38 49.10 587
84 85 5.25 2.59 50.67 739 7.60 4.23 44.34 762 2.67 1.73 35.21 762 5.74 4,03 29.79 762
86 89 0.00 0.00 135 3.90 2.51 35.64 132 3.89 2.61 32.90 131 3.75 2.75 26.67 132
L 90 92 3.32 2.45 26.20 208 7.12 4.94 30.62 230 0.93 0,71 23.66 230 8.07 3.81 52.79 230
93 93 0.00 0.00 17 0.00 0.00 17 1.29 0.94 27.13 17 0.97 0.68 29.90 17
94 96 1.72 1.72 133 17.08 10.90 36.18 131 6.79 4.28 36.97 131 15.13 8.06 46.73 131 t_
<
97 98 0.00 0.00 10 10.52 6.63 36.98 7 3.06 2,78 9,15 8 20.00 7.86 60.70 7 rri
1.28 29.28 4,962 8,36 4.60 44_98 5,018 3.76 Z2t 41.22 4,999 8.17 4.38 46.39 5,019 Average 1.81
Note: Rates and number of lines are based an averages at 6-digit level.
ZANNEX D (CONTINUED)
SINGAPORE THAILAND VIETNAM ASEAN
Chapter Average Rate No. of Average Rate No. of Average Rate No. of Average Rate No, of qjQ
From To 1996 2000 % Dec. Lines 1996 2000 % Dec. Lines 1996 2000 % Dec. Lines 1996 2000 % Dec. Lines Z..
01 05 0.00 0,00 194 21,92 12.97 40,83 195 4.29 4.29 7 6.50 4.15 36,13 167
06 14 0,00 0,00 268 19.13 11.20 41.45 233 4.43 4.43 23 5.40 3.44 36,23 229
15 15 0.00 0.00 52 13.56 4.72 65.19 53 4.00 4.00 16 4.59 2-24 51.18 47
16 24 0.00 0.00 158 21.47 12,58 41.41 143 5.00 5.00 1 7,79 4.80 38.29 144
25 27 0.00 0.00 - 142 5.53 3.94 28.75 151 1.21 1,21 67 2.05 1.60 21.91 138
28 38 0.00 0.00 759 9.36 5,47 41.56 758 1.00 1.00 21 2.77 1.83 33.80 653 ,._
39 40 0.05 0.04 20,00 189 19.69 8.11 58.81 189 2.81 2.81 16 6.72 3.09 53.98 164
41 43 0.00 0.00 74 10,59 4,73 55,34 74 3.67 3.67 24 5.88 2,83 51.88 67
44 46 0,00 0.00 - 79 12.41 7.49 39.65 79 4.50 4.50 8 7.72 4,50 41,66 67
47 49 0.00 0.00 - 149 16.81 10.54 37.30 149 1.87 1,87 27 5.47 3.39 38.06 131
50 63 0.00 0.00 - 809 20.28 5.19 74.41 809 1,39 1.39 42 8.15 3.43 57.90 699
64 67 0.00 0.00 55 22.62 13,41 40.72 55 I _00 1.00 1 9.71 5.97 38.51 47 Z
68 70 0.00 0.00 130 18.37 7,00 61.89 138 1.88 1.88 25 6.66 3.29 50,52 122
71 71 0.00 0,00 52 7.27 2.89 60.25 52 0.00 0.00 3.57 2.40 32.77 45
72 83 0.00 0,00 - 587 12,62 8.39 33.52 587 0.46 0.46 145 5.23 3.19 38.87 524
84 85 0,00 0,00 - 762 7,96 5.44 31.66 762 0,09 0,09 336 4.19 2.59 38.21 698
86 89 0.00 0.00 117 9,40 5,94 36.81 132 0,31 0,31 35 3,04 2,02 33.55 116
90 90 0.00 0.00 230 9.24 6,38 30.95 230 0,71 0.71 42 4.20 2,71 35.35 200
93 93 0,00 0.00 17 22.79 I3.38 41,29 17 0.00 0.00 3.58 2.14 40.12 15
94 96 0,00 0,00 131 20,58 10,67 48,15 131 0.00 0.00 1 8.76 5.09 41.88 113
97 98 0.00 0.00 9 8.93 5,36 39.98 7 0.00 0.00 6,07 3,23 46,77 7
Average 0.00 0.00 4,971 13,95 7.08 49.25 4,944 0.92 0,92 837 5,28 2.92 44,63 4,393
Note: Rates and number of fines are based on averages at 6-digit level,ANNEX E _a
Simple Average of Tariff Rates by Sector/Section
Merged CEPT and MFN Rates
BRUNEI INDONESIA MALAYSIA PHILIPPINES SINGAPORE THAILAND ASEAN
Chapter Ave. No. of Ave. No. of Ave. No. of Ave. No. of Ave. No. of Ave. No. of Ave. Ave. #
From To Rate Lines Rate Lines Rate Lines Rate Lines Rate Lines Rate Lines Rate of Lines
01 05 0.00 198 12.09 213 1.06 216 10.02 213 0.0(3 213 21.92 t95 7.52 208
06 14 0.00 275 6,99 282 0.65 281 7.88 283 0.07 281 20.23 241 5.97 274
15 15 0.00 53 5.33 53 1.62 54 8.11 55 0.00 53 13.31 54 4.73 54
16 24 0.06 167 15.30 191 4.43 189 11.23 191 0.00 189 19.87 169 8,48 183
25 27 0.00 153 3.06 153 0.83 154 3.74 152 0_00 153 5.53 151 2,19 153
28 38 0.36 767 3.25 813 0.68 813 5.04 •8t2 0.00 813 9.36 758 3,12 796 O
39 40 0.07 193 7.45 204 8.44 200 9.19 204 0.05 204 19,59 190 7.47 199
74 16.34 74 0.00 74 10.59 74 6.25 74 41 43 0.59 74 7.16 74 2.82
44 46 8.31 79 8.05 95 10.67 96 I3.92 95 0.0(3 96 12.41 79 8,89 90 >
47 49 0.00 149 6,26 151 7.16 151 6.16 151 0.00 151 16.81 149 6.07 150 r'*
50 63 3.53 818 13,83 828 7,32 827 11.07 828 0,00 828 20,28 809 9.34 823
64 67 3.79 56 19,93 57 11.27 57 10,93 57 0.0(3 57 22.62 55 11.42 57
68 70 0.27 138 9,20 153 6.79 154 11.46 153 0.04 153 18.37 138 7.69 148 r-_
71 71 2,60 52 7.99 52 1,25 52 5.91 52 0.00 52 7.27 52 4.17 52
72 /83 0.06 590 8.27 665 4.87 661 10.67 664 0.00 663 12,58 589 6.08 639
84 85 5.70 762 7,95 852 3.15 854 6.40 852 0.00 845 7.98 763 5.20 821
86 89 0.15 136 3.88 133 4.06 133 3,74 133 0.130 133 9,40 132 3.54 133
90 92 4.89 231 7.25 246 1.14 246 7.74 246 000 246 9.24 230 5.04 241 _
93 93 0,00 17 0.00 17 1,29 17 0.97 17 0.00 17 22,79 17 4.18 17 rfl
94 96 1.85 134 17.08 131 6.79 131 15.13 131 0,00 131 20.58 131 10.24 132 _)
97 98 0,00 10 10,52 7 3,06 8 20.00 7 0.00 9 8.93 7 7.09 8
tn
Average 1.99 5,052 855 5,370 4.00 5,368 8.54 5,370 0.01 5,361 13.99 4,983 6.18 5,251 _ZAZARCON: TARIFFPOLICIESIN ASEAN 135
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